

Go To
The
Rally

Loyola NEWS

Or
Else

Vol. 44 - No. 3

LOYOLA OF MONTREAL

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1967

It is an article of faith that American motives are pure, and not subject to analysis. Although it is nothing new in American intellectual history -- or, for that matter, in the general history of imperialist apologia -- this innocence becomes increasingly distasteful as the power it serves grows more dominant in world affairs, and more capable, therefore, of the unconstrained viciousness that the mass media present to us each day. We are hardly the first power in history to combine material interests, great technological capacity, and an utter disregard for the suffering and the misery of the lower orders.

Naom Chomsky, The New York Review, 23/11/67

The continual fevered musings -- the fever produced by contradictory "facts", by the exigencies of necessity versus those of conscience, by caged furies and hopelessness. One can get worked up about Viet Nam to the degree that one can get worked up about individual and common humanity. Viet Nam has everything, a microcosm of Humanity Now. The musings are fevered because Viet Nam refuses to be simple and concrete except in isolated bits.

Viet Nam brings the conflict within us into focus, the conflict between "moral and technological valuations" as we see later. Now Peter Globenski, a Political Science senior and a confused partial hawk, writes briefly about the 'new way' of looking at war.

War used to be a cold, calculated operation. The administration and military of the warring countries were the know-alls and do-alls; they were in control. The public was of course involved, but this involvement was controlled.

In pre-Viet Nam conflicts the pattern was this: the awed public sat impatient and easy to please as statistics of victory were fed to them. The inevitable "contact gap" between government and governed helped reduce public fear, and national pride was easily fattened. Behind incentive and motivation was the hoped-for result, the eventual victory. After all, aggression meant nothing if ultimate purpose was non-existent.

But today John Q. Public is not as much interested in the eventual outcome as he is in the here-and-now of it all -- the slaughter of people, the waste of home, lands, etc. Outcome does not seem to be as important as immediate effect.

Never before has the concept of the morality of war entered the actual picture. The American government is running the war "as it should be done", while much of the public questions the existence of war, its morality and its benefits. The Administration looks at war as resulting in ideological victory -- this is essentially why they are there and all other reasons are derivative from this point. But Society comes along and does what it should have done a long time ago, it questions the very "morality" of war.

Hold it. Let's keep things in perspective. What about the tangible red threat?

Behind it all there is still a strong commitment to repel Communism . . . but there are confusing shades . . .

Consider Walt Rostow's views on American policy in Asia. The basis upon which we must build this policy is that "we are openly threatened and we feel menaced by Communist China". To prove that we are menaced is of course unnecessary and the matter receives no attention; it is enough that we *feel* menaced. (Naom Chomsky)

Editorial

"Do as I say . . .":

a dialectic in material and morality

There was a fair amount of doubt over this special issue of the NEWS.

Can more be said about the Viet Nam war? Certainly. Will it be new? Perhaps. Will it be listened to?

We are fortunate in having Naom Chomsky and Linus Pauling with us tonight, fortunate not because they are necessarily right but because they are eloquent.

"The Viet Nam issue is one of the colossal quandaries of our time. It would not be so, if there were a simple choice between right and wrong, good and evil."

Come tonight and listen. The eloquent assertions of these men can help make the choice clearer -- and harder.

TONIGHT MAIN AUDITORIUM 8 PM

what, when, why

the beautiful-people view

"Better Red than dead?", they used to ask. A parallel question has emerged. Demands of nation and inexorable history, the straightjacket of "balance of power" and the legacies of a small past error, point to inevitable involvements. If these are distasteful, particularly from a humanitarian-humane standpoint, are they then to be resisted? Can the law of "kill or be killed" be ignored? If it comes to that -- better humane and moral and dead, than politically realistic and alive?

Some think so. If words mean deeds, then there are many strong moral idealists still around. One seems to be Guy Strait, editor of the "Haight-Ashbury Maverick". Listen. Some hippies are thinkies. He wrote this editorial last summer. It isn't off the subject; a true world consciousness has emerged, and no incident or movement is isolated any more.

Pardon Me If I Am Dense

Being surrounded by anti-Viet Nam Americans and being one of them on the grounds that I am opposed to the killing of human beings on any grounds whatsoever . . .

And being surrounded by anti-capital punishment Americans and being one of them on the same grounds . . .





I am amazed that a large number of them can take joy in the plight of the Negro as he fights for freedom in his brutal Newark-Detroit fashion.

I fail to see a huge difference between a black with a gun in his hand shooting at a white American and a white with a hand grenade throwing it at a yellow in Viet Nam.

The difference that I do see is that the black man is, in theory, fighting for his freedom as an American. However, as an American I find it hard to justify the loss of the lives of innocents . . . We can understand how frustration will lead a man to degrees of anger and passion that are to be accounted for only with compassion, understanding, and a degree of sympathy never shown before . . .

If the black man is ready to march on the Capitol Buildings of the North and burn them as they marched on the capitol buildings of the south, then count me in for some shoe leather and some high test with platformate.

But I cannot condone the taking of life . . . even if it has a vague connection with liberty.



A Member of Canadian University Press

Brian McKenna
Editor-in-Chief

Ian Macdonald
Managing Editor

Bob Czerny
Executive Editor

Allanah Murphy Renee Lallier
Features Editor News Editor

Glen Blouin
Sports Editor

Mike Dumas
Photo Editor

Bernie Barrett
Layout Editor

Mike Cressey
Desk Editor

Staff: Steve Szentes, Cathy Coughlin, Jim Packard, R. C. Hanners, J. M. Dauvergne, the sleeping and the dead.

Published by the Board of Publications, Loyola of Montreal Student Association, 6931 Sherbrooke St. West, Montreal, Que. Angelo Ianni, Advertising Manager; tel. 482-5731. Authorized as second class mail by the Postmaster and for payment of postage in cash.

withdraw now

Two Canadians on the I.C.C.

Donovan says "Catch the wind". A fever-producing exercise in futility is to try and catch a fact. Attitudes are pre-determined by facts, not because of any objectivity, but due to the very lack of this in our information.

Exercise: decide which side's meaner. The first report is by Theodore B. Blockley, head of the Canadian Delegation of the International Control Commission, quoted in a letter to the NEWS last fall:

American policy is legally sound

... I regard American policy as legally sound, morally virtuous and wisely expedient ...

In 1957 I reported to the Canadian government that the evidence before the International Commission indicated a mounting intensity of attack by North Viet Nam against South Viet Nam in such flagrant violation of the Cease-Fire Agreement as to warrant S. Viet Nam's denouncement of the agreement and Canada's withdrawal from the Commission ...

As for the moral justification for the American policy in Viet Nam one must first of all note that one man's morality may be another's immorality. We know from the writings of communist authors that there is only one criterion for the morality of an act by a communist -- for communist morality -- that is. That sole criterion is, does the act advance the communist cause. All considerations of love, friendship, honor -- all other concept of 'right', we are told -- is mere 'bourgeois' morality. For me, the late President Kennedy's promise of protection to South Viet Nam is sufficiently binding upon the present American administration -- morally binding ...

Blockley mentions also that it was impossible "to save the life of a single prisoner of the North Viet Nameese". The next report is by Hugh Campbell, a Canadian delegate to the I.C.C.; accusing the Commission of "thirteen years of spinelessness", he was submitting a "minority report". He confirmed that the practices of the North, particularly in propaganda, were darker than in the South. But he sets out to tumble the facade of the Americans' expressed aims and legal self-justifications:

The American government has concealed the truth

The official American justification for its policies in South Viet Nam rests on four main arguments:

1. The Americans claim that they have a "right" to be there -- that they were invited by the government of South Viet Nam.
2. They state that this government represents the people of South Viet Nam, while the Viet Cong are "communist terrorists".
3. They claim that North Viet Nam has been guilty of "aggression" against South Viet Nam.
4. The United States, which originally defended air strikes against North Viet Nam as retaliatory, now has abandoned this fiction, and speaks of them as pressure necessary to force North Viet Nam into "unconditional discussions" to end the war ...

"because . . ."



LIFE, AP

Two principals

The Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, has called for negotiations to stop the fighting in South Viet Nam, and stated that if the American people knew the real truth about the situation they would want to withdraw from this war. The obvious implication of his remarks is that the American government has concealed the truth about its military operations in Viet Nam from its own people.

(With reference to 1.) Far from being "invited" into South Viet Nam by its legal government, the Americans created this government, and have used it for their own purposes ever since ...

In 1954 a peace conference was convened at Geneva, chaired by Britain and the Soviet Union, and with all interested great powers invited to participate. This conference made an arbitrary and temporary division of Viet Nam at the 17th parallel, with the Viet Minh armies withdrawing north of the line, and the French to the south. This was to enable the French armies to leave Viet Nam without surrendering, and was to be for a Two-year period only.

... Ngo Dinh Diem had sat out the war in the U.S. and in October, 1954, three months after the agreements were signed he was installed in Saigon to direct a puppet government for the United States ... With American funds, he opened a military academy to train a new army, with the slogan, "we will march to the North".

These open violations of the Geneva agreements not only received American support, but they were in effect an extension of American policy in Viet Nam.

(With reference to 2.) As Walter Lippman has pointed out, the government of South Viet Nam, even in the beginning when the people of that country were weary of war and willing to accept any that was not French, never has had the support of more than 30% of its people ...

Diem is now generally admitted to have been typically fascist in his mentality and in his methods of rule. But in the early years, before popular opposition to his policies became too strong to be ignored he was hailed as a hero by the American press, and dubbed "The Asian Winston Churchill" by no less a person than Lyndon Johnson ...

From the beginning, the government of South Viet Nam has been a military dictatorship. There is no freedom of speech or press. Thousands of opponents of the regime have been arrested and imprisoned without trial ...

Far from being a group of communist "terrorists" the N.L.F. is a broad organization including almost all political and religious opponents of the Diem dictatorship. Its program is far from communist in tone -- it calls for peace, withdrawal of the United States armed forces, democratic elections and eventual reunification with the North around a policy of neutralism ...

There has never been any evidence that the North Vietnamese or the Chinese are the "aggressors" in the war. In fact, all available evidence, including the White Paper issued by the U.S. State Department to justify its air raids on North Viet Nam, points the other way ...

The pattern of bombing raids is remarkably consistent. The American government at first denies such acts of aggression and then is forced to admit them and claim that they are justified. But there is no justification for bombing North Viet Nam towns and villages. A hospital and school were hit on the first big raid. As the I.C.C. majority report pointed out, these raids are acts of aggression against a country with whom the United States is not at war ...

Influential American critics of their own government's policies have concluded that the offer of discussion (4) was "mere verbal trickery, to quell the peace-mongering critics at home and abroad" ...

The offer of unconditional discussion contains conditions which cannot be met. North Viet Nam cannot stop aggression against the South, because it has never been engaged in such aggression ...

Any genuine offer of peace discussions will have to go to the National Liberation Front, which is fighting this war, but President Johnson has stated he will not negotiate with this movement. If the United States is sincerely anxious to stop the war in Vietnam, it needs only to stop its military attacks, and to allow the people of that country to negotiate a peace settlement without outside interference.

use the a-bomb

What the U.N. cannot do

By Cathy Coughlin and Bob Czerny

The first of these two meetings was the opening lecture in a series of ten concerning the United Nations. Dean Maxwell Cohen, McGill Law, outlined the world body's strengths and weaknesses.

Like the war, the story of the U.N. is told in some very human terms. "Imagine if" . . . if a permanent forum did not exist, if observers and peace-keeping forces did not delay what nothing could prevent, if order and system were not brought to decolonization, the spread of self-determination and human rights.

But the listeners had only one question: can the U.N. help stop the war in Southeast Asia? No.

Without the cooperation of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. the great issues cannot be solved. The use of the veto reflects this 'super-reality'.

Even if these two nations reached some accord on the Viet Nam question, some rather important players -- China, North Viet Nam -- are not part of the forum. The great powers are finding it increasingly difficult to push their friends around; and the North Vietnamese cannot accept anything from the U.N. without insulting China.

The next night was not a one-man show but an open meeting of the U.N. Ass'n. of Canada. It was a poignant, heartening experience, another education about humanity (which this war is turning out to be).

A group of housewives, a few businessmen and professionals, a political science student -- a cell group trying to save the world -- we saw these people bound by friendly sincerity and serious anxiety.

There was intellectual anxiety over the North's trump card, China, over the distance between the two sides, and over the great-power ritual of escalation as the (supposed) preamble to the self-humiliation of negotiation.

But the eloquent cry was "War is wrong, terrible, and this horrible killing must stop". In the face of moral entrenchment -- "My country right or wrong" -- the cry was for action from humanitarians, planned action aware of its humanitarian basis and goals.

We breathed night air, cold and illuminating.

More of Noam Chomsky

If it is the responsibility of the intellectual to insist upon the truth, it is also his duty to see events in their historical perspective. Thus one must applaud the insistence of the Secretary of State on the importance of historical analogies, the Munich analogy, for example. As Munich showed, a powerful and aggressive nation with a fanatic belief in its manifest destiny will regard each victory, each extension of its power and authority, as a prelude to the next step. The matter was very well put by Adlai Stevenson, when he spoke of "the old, old route whereby expansive powers push at more and more doors, believing they will open until, at the ultimate door, resistance is unavoidable and major war breaks out." Herein lies the danger of appeasement, as the Chinese tirelessly point out to the Soviet Union--which, they claim, is playing Chamberlain to our Hitler in Vietnam. Of course, the aggressiveness of liberal imperialism is not that of Nazi Germany, though the distinction may seem academic to a Vietnamese peasant who is being gassed or incinerated. We do not want to occupy Asia; we merely wish, to return to Mr. Wolf, "to help the Asian countries progress toward economic modernization, as relatively 'open' and stable societies, to which our access, as a country and as individual citizens, is free and comfortable." The formulation is appropriate. Recent history shows that it makes little difference to us what form of government a country has so long as it remains an "open society," in our peculiar sense of this term--that is, a society that remains open to American economic penetration or political control. If it is necessary to approach genocide in Vietnam to achieve this objective, then this is the price we must pay in defense of freedom and the rights of man.

In pursuing the aim of helping other countries to progress toward open societies, with no thought of territorial aggrandizement, we are breaking no new ground. In the Congressional Hearings that I cited earlier, Hans Morgenthau aptly describes our traditional policy towards China as one which favors "what you might call freedom of competition with regard to the exploitation of China". In fact, few imperialist powers have had explicit territorial ambitions.

It is useful to remember, incidentally, that the US was apparently quite willing, as late as 1939, to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan and arrive at a *modus vivendi* if Japan would "change her attitude and practice towards our rights and interests in China," as Secretary Hull put it. The bombing of Chungking and the rape of Nanking were unpleasant, it is true, but what was really important was our rights and interests in China, as the responsible, unhygienic men of the day saw quite clearly. It was the closing of the open door by Japan that led inevitably to the Pacific war, just as it is the closing of the open door by "Communist" China itself that may very well lead to the next, and no doubt last, Pacific war.

Quite often, the statements of sincere and devoted technical experts give surprising insight into the intellectual attitudes that lie in the background of the latest savagery. Consider, for example, the following comment by the economist Richard Lindholm, in 1959, expressing his frustration over the failure of economic development in "free Vietnam":

. . . the use of American aid is determined by how the Vietnamese use their incomes and their savings. The fact that a large portion of the Vietnamese imports financed with Ameri-

Crisis in Valuation

At times it seems the way is straight, then the labyrinth is tangled again. Facts are the property of one side or another. There seems to be no meaning to meaning. What had hoped to be reasoning is fevered musing.

But there are hints. Humanitarian interest and morality have risen in priority in relation to national inter-

est and political science, in the eyes of the "radical" intellectuals and even the "common people". And simultaneously an old problem is re-emphasized, the problem of moral man and his relationship to material and social environment.

In "Vietnam: Technology v. Morality" (Continuum, summer '67), Dr. Richard C. Hinners explains the conflict between technological and moral valuation, in the Viet Nam situation.

The technological error of escalation is the direct result of the U.S. confusion of its *a priori* belief (that there are no wars of national liberation) with its military technology. Escalation is an error because it promises to unify ideological and political resistance to the escalation. . .

To deny that the insurgent resistance of the N.L.F.-Viet Cong in the South is a war of national liberation and then to transform it into a conventional war of aggression--defence against the North, is bringing about the opposite effect which was intended: attacking and destroying the conventional military power of the North will force the North back to primitive, insurgent guerilla warfare. Thus, the U.S. will then be forced to contend again with its original problem (which it had attempted to get away from) of insurgent, guerilla warfare. . .

So, U.S. escalation of the war in the South and spreading it to the North has already proven to have been a mistake in military technology. But the technological mistake stems from the U.S. confusion of military technology with the ideal anti-communist principle that there are no wars of national liberation. The contradictions or seeming "miscalculations and mistakes" which continue to issue from this confusion constitute a fatal dialectic of escalation-de-escalation which precludes moral choice on the part of the participants. This dialectic is fatal and necessitating because it obscures the objectives or values of actions . . . the dialectic of escalation, the confusion between the origin of the war in the South and the U.S. objective of the war, aggression against the RVN., make it impossible to determine categorically "what our objectives are in Vietnam". . .

Indeed, the "complexity" or contradictions of U.S. involvement in Vietnam are so great that one would hope that Americans would be compelled to look critically at the very structure of their technological-moral valuations. . .

Since man's moral situation is that he must make himself in and through his environment, then it is in his environment of the materials, utensils, and products of his self-making that he encounters his fellow men as workers and consumers. Man's moral situation is then essentially a social situation because it is essentially an economic situation; moral values are a function of and arise within and out of a socio-economic situation. It is within and out of his socio-economic environment that technological man must choose to make or un-make himself. . .

The source of our values is in what we are doing socially and in what we are producing and producing with, rather than in our heads, in our culture, or in our official ideology. Perhaps such issues as Vietnam will yet compel us to this radical but vital recasting of our basic concept of our morality.



BUNKERS AT CON THIEN
In the quagmire, rags for candles.
EVEN TIME HAS "RISING DOUBT"

can aid are either consumer goods or raw materials used rather directly to meet consumer demands is an indication that the Vietnamese people desire these goods, for they have shown their desire by their willingness to use their piasters to purchase them.

In short, the Vietnamese people desire Buicks and air-conditioners, rather than sugar refining equipment or road-building machinery, as they have shown by their behavior in a free market. And however much we may deplore their free choice, we must allow the people to have their way. Of course, there are also those two-legged beasts of burden that one stumbles on in the countryside, but as any graduate student of political science can explain, they are not part of a responsible modernizing elite, and therefore have only a superficial biological resemblance to the human race.

In no small measure, it is attitudes like this that lie behind the butchery in Vietnam, and we had better face up to them with candor, or we will find our government leading us towards a "final solution" in Vietnam, and in the many vietnams that inevitably lie ahead.

Let me finally return to Dwight Macdonald and the responsibility of intellectuals. Macdonald quotes an interview with a death-camp paymaster who burst into tears when told that the Russians would hang him. "Why should they? What have I done?" he asked. Macdonald concludes: "Only those who are willing to resist authority themselves when it conflicts too intolerably with their personal moral code, only they have the right to condemn the death-camp paymaster." The question, "What have I done?" is one that we may well ask ourselves, as we read each day of fresh atrocities in Vietnam--as we create, or mouth, or tolerate the deceptions that will be used to justify the next defense of freedom.